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5.1 Introduction
Rational expectations provide an elegant and powerful framework that
has come to dominate thinking about the dynamic structure of the econ-
omy and econometric policy evaluation over the past thirty years. This
success has spurred further examination of the strong information as-
sumptions implicit in many of its applications. Thomas Sargent (1993)
concludes that “rational expectations models impute much more knowl-
edge to the agents within the model . . . than is possessed by an econome-
trician, who faces estimation and inference problems that the agents in the
model have somehow solved” (3, emphasis in original).1 Researchers have
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1. Missing from such models, as Benjamin Friedman (1979) points out, “is a clear outline
of the way in which economic agents derive the knowledge which they then use to formulate
expectations.” To be sure, this does not constitute a criticism of the traditional use of the con-
cept of “rationality” as reﬂecting the optimal use of information in the formation of expecta-
tions, taking into account an agent’s objectives and resource constraints. The diﬃculty is that
in Muth’s (1961) original formulation, rational expectations are not optimizing in that sense.
Thus, the issue is not that the rational-expectations concept reﬂects too much rationality butproposed reﬁnements to rational expectations that respect the principle
that agents use information eﬃciently in forming expectations, but none-
theless recognize the limits to and costs of information processing and cogni-
tive constraints that inﬂuence the expectations-formation process (Sargent
1999; Evans and Honkapohja 2001; Sims 2003).
In this study, we allow for a form of imperfect knowledge in which eco-
nomic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expecta-
tions. This form of learning represents a relatively modest deviation from
rational expectations that nests the latter as a limiting case. We show that
the resulting process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer
of interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes that has
important implications for macroeconomic dynamics and for monetary
policy design. As we illustrate, monetary policies that would be eﬃcient
under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imper-
fect. In particular, with imperfect knowledge, policies that fail to maintain
tight control over inﬂation are prone to episodes in which the public’s ex-
pectations of inﬂation become uncoupled from the policy objective. The
presence of this imperfection makes stabilization policy more diﬃcult than
would appear under rational expectations and highlights the value of eﬀec-
tively communicating a central bank’s inﬂation objective and of continued
vigilance against inﬂation in anchoring inﬂation expectations and foster-
ing macroeconomic stability.
In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic implications of a process
of “perpetual learning.” Our work builds on the extensive literature relating
rational expectations to learning and the adaptive formation of expecta-
tions (Bray 1982; Bray and Savin 1984; Marcet and Sargent 1989; Woodford
1990; Bullard and Mitra 2002). A key ﬁnding in this literature is that under
certain conditions an economy with learning converges to the rational-
expectations equilibrium (Townsend 1978; Bray 1982, 1983; Blume and
Easley 1982). However, until agents have accumulated suﬃcient knowledge
about the economy, economic outcomes during the transition depend on
the adaptive learning process (Lucas 1986). Moreover, in a changing eco-
nomic environment, agents are constantly learning, and their beliefs con-
verge not to a ﬁxed rational-expectations equilibrium but to an ergodic dis-
tribution around it (Sargent 1999; Evans and Honkapohja 2001).2
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rather that it imposes too little rationality in the expectations formation process. For example,
as Sims (2003) has pointed out, optimal information processing subject to a ﬁnite cognitive
capacity may result in fundamentally diﬀerent processes for the formation of expectations
from those implied by rational expectations. To acknowledge this terminological tension, Si-
mon (1978) suggested that a less misleading term for Muth’s concept would be “model con-
sistent” expectations (2).
2. Our work also draws on some other strands of the literature related to learning, estimation,
and policy design. One such strand has examined the formation of inﬂation expectations when
the policymaker’s objective may be unknown or uncertain—for example, during a transition
following a shift in policy regime (Taylor 1975; Bomﬁm et al. 1997; Erceg and Levin 2003; Koz-As a laboratory for our experiment, we employ a simple linear model of
the U.S. economy with characteristics similar to more elaborate models
frequently used to study optimal monetary policy. We assume that eco-
nomic agents know the correct structure of the economy and form expec-
tations accordingly. But, rather than endowing them with complete knowl-
edge of the parameters of these functions—as would be required by
imposing the rational-expectations assumption—we posit that economic
agents rely on ﬁnite memory least squares estimation to update these pa-
rameter estimates. This setting conveniently nests rational expectations as
the limiting case corresponding to inﬁnite memory least squares estima-
tion and allows varying degrees of imperfection in expectations formation
to be characterized by variation in a single model parameter.
We ﬁnd that even marginal deviations from rational expectations in the
direction of imperfect knowledge can have economically important eﬀects
on the stochastic behavior of our economy and policy evaluation. An inter-
esting feature of the model is that the interaction of learning and control
creates rich nonlinear dynamics that can potentially explain both the shift-
ing parameter structure of linear reduced-form characterizations of the
economy and the appearance of shifting policy objectives or inﬂation tar-
gets. For example, sequences of policy errors or inﬂationary shocks, such as
were experienced during the 1970s, could give rise to stagﬂationary episodes
that do not arise under rational expectations with perfect knowledge.
Indeed, the critical role of the formation of inﬂation expectations for
understanding the successes and failures of monetary policy is a dimen-
sion of policy that has often been cited by policymakers over the past two
decades but that has received much less attention in formal econometric
policy evaluations. An important example is the contrast between the stub-
born persistence of inﬂation expectations during the 1970s, when policy
placed relatively greater attention on countercyclical concerns, and the
much-improved stability in both inﬂation and inﬂation expectations fol-
lowing the renewed emphasis on price stability in 1979. In explaining the
rationale for this shift in emphasis in 1979, Federal Reserve Chairman
Volcker highlighted the importance of learning in shaping the inﬂation
expectations formation process.3
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icki and Tinsley 2001; Tetlow and von zur Muehlen 2001). Another strand has considered how
policymaker uncertainty about the structure of the economy inﬂuences policy choices and eco-
nomic dynamics (Balvers and Cosimano 1994; Wieland 1998; Sargent 1999; and others). Fi-
nally, our work relates to explorations of alternative approaches for modeling aggregate inﬂa-
tion expectations, such as Ball (2000), Carroll (2003), and Mankiw and Reis (2002).
3. Indeed, we would argue that the shift in emphasis toward greater focus on inﬂation was
itself inﬂuenced by the recognition of the importance of facilitating the formation of stable in-
ﬂation expectations—which had been insuﬃciently appreciated earlier during the 1970s. See
Orphanides (2004) for a more detailed description of the policy discussion at the time and the
nature of the improvement in monetary policy since 1979. See also Christiano and Gust
(2000) and Sargent (1999) for alternative explanations of the rise in inﬂation during the 1960s
and 1970s.It is not necessary to recite all the details of the long series of events that
have culminated in the serious inﬂationary environment that we are now
experiencing. An entire generation of young adults has grown up since
the mid-1960’s knowing only inﬂation, indeed an inﬂation that has
seemed to accelerate inexorably. In the circumstances, it is hardly sur-
prising that many citizens have begun to wonder whether it is realistic to
anticipate a return to general price stability, and have begun to change
their behavior accordingly. Inﬂation feeds in part on itself, so part of the
job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be
to break the grip of inﬂationary expectations. (Volcker 1979, 888)
This historical episode is a clear example of inﬂation expectations becom-
ing uncoupled from the intended policy objective and illustrates the point
that the design of monetary policy must account for the inﬂuence of policy
on expectations.
We ﬁnd that policies designed to be eﬃcient under rational expectations
can perform very poorly when knowledge is imperfect. This deterioration
in performance is particularly severe when policymakers put a high weight
on stabilizing real economic activity relative to price stability. Our analysis
yields two conclusions for the conduct of monetary policy when knowl-
edge is imperfect. First, policies that emphasize tight inﬂation control can
facilitate learning and provide better guidance for the formation of inﬂa-
tion expectations. Second, eﬀective communication of an explicit numeri-
cal inﬂation target can help focus inﬂation expectations and thereby reduce
the costs associated with imperfect knowledge. Policies that combine vigi-
lance against inﬂation with an explicit numerical inﬂation target mitigate
the negative inﬂuence of imperfect knowledge on economic stabilization
and yield superior macroeconomic performance. Thus, our ﬁndings pro-
vide analytical support for monetary policy frameworks that emphasize
the primacy of price stability as an operational policy objective—for ex-
ample, the inﬂation-targeting approach discussed by Bernanke and Mish-
kin (1997) and adopted by several central banks over the past decade or so.
5.2 The Model Economy
We consider a stylized model that gives rise to a nontrivial inﬂation-
output variability trade-oﬀ and in which a simple one-parameter policy
rule represents optimal monetary policy under rational expectations.4 In
this section, we describe the model speciﬁcation for inﬂation and output
and the central bank’s optimization problem; in the next two sections, we
take up the formation of expectations by private agents.
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4. Since its introduction by Taylor (1979), the practice of analyzing monetary policy rules
using such an inﬂation-output variability trade-oﬀhas been adopted in a large number of aca-
demic and policy studies.Inﬂation is determined by a modiﬁed Lucas supply function that allows
for some intrinsic inﬂation persistence,
(1)  t 1      e
t 1   (1    ) t    yt 1   et 1, e ~ i.i.d.(0,  e
2),
where  denotes the inﬂation rate,  eis the private agents’ expected inﬂation
rate based on time t information, i.i.d. indicates “independently and identi-
cally distributed,” yis the output gap,   (0, 1),   0, and eis a serially un-
correlated innovation. As discussed by Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999)
and Lengwiler and Orphanides (2002), this speciﬁcation incorporates an
important role for inﬂation expectations for determining inﬂation outcomes
while also allowing for some inﬂation persistence that is necessary for the
model to yield a nontrivial inﬂation-output gap variability trade-oﬀ.5
We assume that the policymaker can set policy during period t so as to
determine the intended level of the output gap for period t   1, xt, subject
to a control error, ut 1,
(2) yt 1   xt   ut 1 u ~ i.i.d.(0,  2
u).
This is equivalent to assuming that the intended output gap for period t  
1 is determined by the real rate gap set during period t, xt   – (rt – r∗),
where r is the short-term real interest rate and r∗ is the equilibrium real
rate.6 As will become clear, with this assumption the model has the prop-
erty that under perfect knowledge both the optimal policy rule and the
optimal inﬂation-forecast rule can be written in terms of a single state var-
iable, the lagged inﬂation rate. This facilitates our analysis. Inﬂation ex-
pectations are fundamentally anchored by monetary policy, while output
expectations are anchored by views of aggregate supply that are presum-
ably less inﬂuenced by monetary policy. For this reason, we focus on the
interaction between monetary policy and inﬂation expectations.
The central bank’s objective is to design a policy rule that minimizes the
loss, denoted by  , equal to the weighted average of the asymptotic vari-
ances of the output gap and of deviations of inﬂation from the target rate,
(3)     (1    )Var(y)    Var(    ∗),
where Var(z) denotes the unconditional variance of variable z, and     (0,
1] is the relative weight on inﬂation stabilization. This completes the de-
scription of the structure of the model economy, with the exception of the
expectations formation process that we examine in detail below.
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5. We have also examined the “New Keynesian” variant of the Phillips curve studied by
Galí and Gertler (1999) and others, which also allows for some intrinsic inﬂation inertia. As
we report in section 5.6, our main ﬁndings are not sensitive to this alternative.
6. Note, however, that this abstracts from the important complications associated with the
real-time measurement of the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate for formulat-
ing the policy rule. See Orphanides (2003a), Laubach and Williams (2003), and Orphanides
and Williams (2002) for analyses of these issues.5.3 The Perfect-Knowledge Benchmark
We begin by considering the “textbook” case of rational expectations with
perfect knowledge in which private agents know both the structure of the
economy and the central bank’s policy. In this case, expectations are ra-
tional in that they are consistent with the true data-generating process of
the economy (the model). In the next section, we use the resulting equilib-
rium solution as a “perfect-knowledge” benchmark against which we com-
pare outcomes under imperfect knowledge, in which case agents do not
know the structural parameters of the model but instead must form expec-
tations based on estimated forecasting models.
Under the assumption of perfect knowledge, both the evolution of the
economy and optimal monetary policy can be expressed in terms of two
variables, the current inﬂation rate and its target level. These variables de-
termine the formation of expectations and the policy choice, which, to-
gether with serially uncorrelated shocks, determine output and inﬂation in
period t 1. Speciﬁcally, we can write the monetary policy rule in terms of
the inﬂation gap,
(4) xt      ( t    ∗),
where   0 measures the responsiveness of the intended output gap to the
inﬂation gap.
Given this monetary policy rule, inﬂation expectations are
(5)  e














   t.
Inﬂation expectations depend on the current level of inﬂation, the inﬂation
target, and the parameter  measuring the central bank’s responsiveness to
the inﬂation gap. Substituting this expression for expected inﬂation into
equation (1) yields the rational-expectations solution for inﬂation for a
given monetary policy,












   t   et 1    ut 1.
One noteworthy feature of this solution is that the ﬁrst-order autocorrela-
tion of the inﬂation rate, given by 1 – ([  ]/[1 –  ]), is decreasing in   and
is invariant to the value of  ∗. Note that the rational-expectations solution
can also be written in terms of the “inﬂation expectations gap”—the diﬀer-
ence between inﬂation expectations for period t   1 from the inﬂation tar-
get,  e
t 1 –  ∗,
(7)  e








 ( t    ∗).
Equations (4) and (5) close the perfect-knowledge benchmark model.
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For the economy with perfect knowledge, the optimal monetary policy,
 P, can be obtained in closed form and is given by7


















    
)
    for 0    1.
In the limit, when   equals unity (that is, when the policymaker is not at all
concerned with output stability), the policymaker sets the real interest rate
so that inﬂation is expected to return to its target in the next period. The op-
timal policy in the case   1 is given by  P   (1–  )/ , and the irreducible
variance of inﬂation, owing to unpredictable output and inﬂation innova-
tions, equals  e
2   2 2
u. More generally, the optimal value of  depends pos-
itively on the ratio (1 –  )/ , and the parameters  and  enter only in terms
of this ratio. In particular, the optimal policy response is larger the greater
the degree of intrinsic inertia in inﬂation, measured by 1 –  .
The greater the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilization, the
greater is the responsiveness to the inﬂation gap and the smaller the ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation in inﬂation. Diﬀerentiating equation (8) shows that
the policy responsiveness to the inﬂation gap is increasing in  , the weight
the central bank places on inﬂation stabilization. As a result, the autocor-
relation of inﬂation is decreasing in  , with a limiting value approaching
unity when  approaches zero, and zero when  equals 1. That is, if the cen-
tral bank cares only about output stabilization, the inﬂation rate becomes
a random walk, while if the central bank cares only about inﬂation stabi-
lization, the inﬂation rate displays no serial correlation. And, as noted, this
model yields a nontrivial monotonic trade-oﬀbetween the variability of in-
ﬂation and the output gap for all values of     (0, 1]. These results are il-
lustrated in ﬁgure 5.1. Panel A of the ﬁgure shows the variability trade-oﬀ
described by optimal policies for values of   between zero and 1. Panel B
plots the optimal values of   against  .
5.4 Imperfect Knowledge
As the perfect-knowledge solution shows, private inﬂation forecasts de-
pend on knowledge of the structural model parameters and of policymaker
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7. The optimal policy can be described in terms of the Euler equation that relates the in-
tended output gap to the inﬂation rate and the intended output gap expected in the next pe-
riod:








  t 1 .
Under the assumption of serially uncorrelated shocks, the solution simpliﬁes to the expres-
sion given in the text.A
B
Fig. 5.1 A, Eﬃcient policy frontier with perfect knowledge; B, Optimal policy re-
sponse to inﬂation
Notes: The top panel shows the eﬃcient policy frontier corresponding to optimal policies for
diﬀerent values of the relative preference for inﬂation stabilization  , for the two speciﬁed pa-
rameterizations of   and  . The bottom panel shows the optimal response to inﬂation corre-
sponding to the alternative weights   which are identical for the two parameterizations.preferences. In addition, these parameters inﬂuence the expectations for-
mation function nonlinearly. We now relax the assumption that private
agents have perfect knowledge of all structural parameters and policy-
maker preferences. Instead, we posit that agents must somehow infer the
information necessary for forming expectations by observing historical
data, in essence acting like econometricians who know the correct speciﬁ-
cation of the economy but are uncertain about the parameters of the
model.
In particular, we assume that private agents update the coeﬃcients of
their model for forecasting inﬂation using least squares learning with ﬁnite
memory. We focus on least squares learning because of its desirable con-
vergence  properties, straightforward implementation, and close corre-
spondence to what real-world forecasters actually do.8 Estimation with
ﬁnite memory reﬂects agents’ concern for changes in the structural
parameters of the economy. To focus our attention on the role of imper-
fections in the expectations formation process itself, however, we deliber-
ately abstract from the introduction of the actual uncertainty in the struc-
ture of the economy which would justify such concerns in equilibrium.
Further, we do not model the policymaker’s knowledge or learning but in-
stead focus on the implications of policy based on simple time-invariant
rules of the form given in equation (4) that do not require explicit treatment
of the policymaker’s learning problem.9
We model perpetual learning by assuming that agents use a constant
gain in their recursive least squares formula that places greater weight on
more recent observations, as in Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001). This algorithm is equivalent to applying weighted least squares
where the weights decline geometrically with the distance in time between
the observation being weighted and the most recent observation. This ap-
proach is closely related to the use of ﬁxed sample lengths or rolling-
window regressions to estimate a forecasting model (Friedman 1979). In
terms of the mean “age” of the data used, a rolling-regression window of
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8. This method of adaptive learning is closely related to optimal ﬁltering, where the struc-
tural parameters are assumed to follow random walks. Of course, if private agents know the
complete structure of the model—including the laws of motion for inﬂation, output, the un-
observed states, and the distributions of the innovations to these processes—then they could
compute eﬃcient inﬂation forecasts that could outperform those based on recursive least
squares. However, uncertainty regarding the precise structure of the time variation in the
model parameters is likely to reduce the real eﬃciency gains from a method optimized to a
particular model speciﬁcation relative to a simple method such as least squares learning. Fur-
ther, once we begin to ponder how economic agents could realistically model and account for
such uncertainty precisely, we quickly recognize the signiﬁcance of respecting (or the absurd-
ity of ignoring) the cognitive and computational limits of economic agents.
9. We also abstract from two other elements that may further complicate policy design: the
possibilities that policymakers may rely on a misspeciﬁed model or a misspeciﬁed informa-
tion set for computing agents’ expectations; see Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) and Or-
phanides (2003a), respectively, for a discussion of these two issues.length l is equivalent to a constant gain   of 2/l. The advantage of the con-
stant gain least squares algorithm over rolling regressions is that the evo-
lution of the former system is fully described by a small set of variables,
while the latter requires one to keep track of a large number of variables.
5.4.1 Least Squares Learning with Finite Memory
Under perfect knowledge, the predictable component of next period’s
inﬂation rate is a linear function of the inﬂation target and the current in-
ﬂation rate, where the coeﬃcients on the two variables are functions of the
policy parameter   and the other structural parameters of the model, as
shown in equation (5). In addition, the optimal value of   is itself a nonlin-
ear function of the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilization and the
other model structural parameters. Given this simple structure, the least
squares regression of inﬂation on a constant and lagged inﬂation,
(9)  i   c0,t   c1,t i 1   vi,
yields consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients describing the law of motion
for inﬂation (Marcet and Sargent 1988; Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
Agents then use these results to form their inﬂation expectations.10
To ﬁx notation, let Xi and ci be the 2   1 vectors Xi   (1,  i–1)  and ci  
(c0,i, c1,i) . Using data through period t, the least squares regression pa-
rameters for equation (9) can be written in recursive form:
(10) ct   ct 1    tRt
 1Xt( t   X  tct 1),
(11) Rt   Rt 1    t(XtX  t   Rt 1),
where  t is the gain. With least squares learning with inﬁnite memory,  t  
1/t, so as t increases,  t converges to zero. As a result, as the data accumu-
late this mechanism converges to the correct expectations functions and
the economy converges to the perfect-knowledge benchmark solution. As
noted above, to formalize perpetual learning—as would be required in the
presence of structural change—we replace the decreasing gain in the inﬁ-
nite-memory recursion with a small constant gain,   0.11
With imperfect knowledge, expectations are based on the perceived law
of motion of the inﬂation process, governed by the perpetual-learning al-
gorithm described above. The model under imperfect knowledge consists
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10. Note that here we assume that agents employ a reduced form of the expectations for-
mation function that is correctly speciﬁed under rational expectations with perfect knowl-
edge. However, agents may be uncertain of the correct form and estimate a more general spec-
iﬁcation: for example, a linear regression with additional lags of inﬂation, which nests
equation (9). In section 5.6, we also discuss results from such an example.
11. In terms of forecasting performance, the “optimal” choice of   depends on the relative
variances of the transitory and permanent shocks, as in the relationship between the Kalman
gain and the signal-to-noise ratio in the case of the Kalman ﬁlter. Here, we do not explicitly
attempt to calibrate   in this way but instead examine the eﬀects for a range of values of  .of the structural equation for inﬂation (1), the output-gap equation (2), the
monetary policy rule (4), and the one-step-ahead forecast for inﬂation,
given by
(12)  e
t 1   c0,t   c1,t t,
where c0,t and c1,t are updated according to equations (10) and (11).
We emphasize that in the limit of perfect knowledge (that is, as   → 0),
the expectations function above converges to rational expectations and the
stochastic coeﬃcients for the intercept and slope collapse to
c0


















Thus, this modeling approach accommodates the Lucas critique in the
sense that expectations formation is endogenous and adjusts to changes in
policy or structure (as reﬂected here by changes in the parameters  ,  ∗,  ,
and  ). In essence, our model is one of “noisy rational expectations.” As we
show below, although expectations are imperfectly rational, in that agents
need to estimate the reduced-form equations they employ to form expec-
tations, they are nearly rational, in that the forecasts are close to being eﬃ-
cient.
5.5 Perpetual Learning in Action
We use model simulations to illustrate how learning aﬀects the dynam-
ics of inﬂation expectations, inﬂation, and output in the model economy.
First, we examine the behavior of the estimated coeﬃcients of the inﬂation-
forecast equation and evaluate the performance of inﬂation forecasts. We
then consider the dynamic response of the economy to shocks similar to
those experienced during the 1970s in the United States. Speciﬁcally, we
compare the outcomes under perfect knowledge and imperfect knowledge
with least squares learning that correspond to three alternative monetary
policy rules to illustrate the additional layer of dynamic interaction intro-
duced by the imperfections in the formation of inﬂation expectations.
In calibrating the model for the simulations, each period corresponds to
about half a year. We consider values of   of 0.025, 0.05, and 0.075, which
roughly correspond to using forty, twenty, or thirteen years of data, re-
spectively, in the context of rolling regressions. We consider two values for
 , the parameter that measures the inﬂuence of inﬂation expectations on
inﬂation. As a baseline case, we set   to 0.75, which implies a signiﬁcant
role for intrinsic inﬂation inertia, consistent with the contracting models
of Buiter and Jewitt (1981), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and Brayton et al.
Imperfect Knowledge, Inﬂation Expectations, and Monetary Policy 211(1997).12 In the alternative speciﬁcation, we allow for a greater role for ex-
pectations and correspondingly give less weight to inﬂation inertia by set-
ting   0.9, consistent with the ﬁndings of Galí and Gertler (1999) and
others. To ease comparisons between the two values of  , we set   so that
the optimal policy under perfect knowledge is identical in the two cases.
Speciﬁcally, for   0.75, we set   0.25, and for   0.9, we set   0.1.
In all cases, we assume   e    u   1.
The three alternative policies we consider correspond to the values of  ,
{0.1, 0.6, 1.0}, which represent the optimal policies under perfect knowl-
edge for policymakers whose preferences reﬂect a relative weight on inﬂa-
tion,  , of 0.01, 0.5, and 1, respectively. Hence,   0.1 corresponds to an
“inﬂation dove” policymaker who is primarily concerned about output sta-
bilization,   0.6 corresponds to a policymaker with “balanced prefer-
ences” who weighs inﬂation and output stabilization equally, and   1
corresponds to an “inﬂation hawk” policymaker who cares exclusively
about inﬂation.
5.5.1 The Performance of Least Squares Inﬂation Forecasts
Even absent shocks to the structure of the economy, the process of least
squares learning generates time variation in the formation of inﬂation ex-
pectations and thereby in the processes of inﬂation and output. The mag-
nitude of this time variation is increasing in  —which is equivalent to us-
ing shorter samples (and thus less information from the historical data) in
rolling regressions. Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of the estimates of
agents’ inﬂation-forecasting models based on stochastic simulations of the
model economy for the two calibrations we consider. As seen in the table,
the unconditional standard deviations of the estimates increase with  .
This dependence of the variation in the estimates on the rate of learning is
portrayed in ﬁgure 5.2, which shows the steady-state distributions of the es-
timates of c0 and c1 for the case of   0.75. For comparison, the vertical
lines in each panel indicate the values of c0 and c1 in the corresponding
perfect-knowledge benchmark.
The median values of the coeﬃcient estimates are nearly identical to the
values implied by the perfect-knowledge benchmark; however, the mean
estimates of c1 are biased downward slightly. Although not shown in the
table, the mean and median values of c0are nearly zero, consistent with the
assumed inﬂation target of zero. There is contemporaneous correlation be-
tween estimates of c0, and c1 is nearly zero. Each of these estimates, how-
ever, is highly serially correlated, with ﬁrst-order autocorrelations just be-
low unity. This serial correlation falls only slightly as   increases.
Note that a more aggressive policy response to inﬂation reduces the vari-
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12. Other researchers suggest an even smaller role for expectations relative to intrinsic in-
ertia; see Fuhrer (1997), Roberts (2001), and Rudd and Whelan (2001).ation in the estimated intercept, c0, but increases the magnitude of ﬂuctua-
tions in the coeﬃcient on the lagged inﬂation rate, c1. In the case of   1,
the distribution of estimates of c1 is nearly symmetrical around zero. For
  0.1 and 0.6, the distribution of estimates of c1 is skewed to the left, re-
ﬂecting the accumulation of mass around unity, but the absence of much
mass above 1.1.
Finite-memory least squares forecasts perform very well in this model
economy. As shown in table 5.2, the mean-squared error of agents’ one-
step-ahead inﬂation forecasts is only slightly above the theoretical mini-
mum given in the ﬁrst line of the table (labeled “Perfect knowledge”).13
Only when both inﬂation displays very little intrinsic inertia and the policy-
maker places very little weight on inﬂation stabilization does the perfor-
mance of ﬁnite-memory least squares forecasts break down. Not surpris-
ingly, given that we assume that the structure of the economy is ﬁxed,
agents’ forecasting performance deteriorates somewhat as   increases.
Nonetheless, ﬁnite-memory least squares estimates perform better than
those with inﬁnite memory (based on the full sample), and the diﬀerence in
performance is more pronounced the greater the role of inﬂation expecta-
tions in determining inﬂation. In an economy where inﬂation is determined
by the forecasts of other agents who use ﬁnite-memory least squares, it is
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Table 5.1 Least squares learning, by value of  
RE   0.75,   0.25   0.90,   0.10
0 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.025 0.050 0.075
  0.1
Mean c1 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.88 0.89 0.93
Median c1 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.97 0.98
SD c0 0.00 0.37 0.67 1.01 0.79 2.06 4.92
SD c1 0.00 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.20
  0.6
Mean c1 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.33
Median c1 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.42
SD c0 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.40 0.66 0.91
SD c1 0.00 0.20 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.42 0.50
  1.0
Mean c1 0.00 –0.02 –0.04 –0.05 –0.03 –0.03 –0.04
Median c1 0.00 –0.02 –0.04 –0.05 –0.03 –0.04 –0.06
SD c0 0.00 0.24 0.35 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.74
SD c1 0.00 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.44 0.51
Notes: RE   rational expectations. SD   standard deviation.
13. This is consistent with earlier ﬁndings regarding least squares estimation. Anderson
and Taylor (1976), for example, emphasize that least squares forecasts can be accurate even
when consistent estimates of individual parameter estimates are much harder to obtain.better to follow suit rather than to use estimates that would have better
forecast properties under perfect knowledge (Evans and Ramey 2001).
With imperfect knowledge, the private agents’ ability to forecast inﬂa-
tion depends on the monetary policy in place, with forecast errors on av-
erage smaller when policy responds more aggressively to inﬂation. This
eﬀect is more pronounced the greater the role of inﬂation expectations in
determining inﬂation. The marginal beneﬁt from tighter inﬂation control
on the ability of private agents to forecast accurately is greatest when the
policymaker places relatively little weight on inﬂation stabilization. In this
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Fig. 5.2 Estimated expectations function parameters (  0.75,   0.25)
Notes: The intercept and slope refer to the coeﬃcients c0 and c1, respectively, in the agents’
forecasting equation (9). The plots show the steady-state distributions of the estimates of c0
and c1 for diﬀerent values of   and  .case, inﬂation is highly serially correlated, and the estimates of c1 are fre-
quently in the vicinity of unity. Evidently, the ability to forecast inﬂation
deteriorates when inﬂation is nearly a random walk. As seen by comparing
the cases of   of 0.6 and 1.0, the marginal beneﬁt of tight inﬂation control
disappears once the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation is well below 1.
Finally, even though only one lag of inﬂation appears in the equations
for inﬂation and inﬂation expectations, it is possible to improve on inﬁnite-
memory least squares forecasts by including additional lags of inﬂation in
the estimated forecasting equation. This result is similar to that found in
empirical studies of inﬂation, where relatively long lags of inﬂation help
predict inﬂation (Staiger, Stock, and Watson 1997; Stock and Watson
1999; Brayton, Roberts, and Williams 1999). Evidently, in an economy
where agents use adaptive learning, multiperiod lags of inﬂation are a rea-
sonable proxy for inﬂation expectations. This result may also help explain
the ﬁnding that survey-based inﬂation expectations do not appear to be
“rational” using standard tests (Roberts 1997, 1998). With adaptive learn-
ing, inﬂation-forecast errors are correlated with data in the agents’ infor-
mation set; the standard test for forecast eﬃciency applies only to stable
economic environments in which agents’ estimates of the forecast model
have converged to the true values.
5.5.2 Least Squares Learning and Inﬂation Persistence
The time variation in inﬂation expectations resulting from perpetual
learning induces greater serial correlation in inﬂation. As shown in table
5.3, the ﬁrst-order unconditional autocorrelation of inﬂation increases
with  . The ﬁrst column shows the autocorrelations for inﬂation under per-
Imperfect Knowledge, Inﬂation Expectations, and Monetary Policy 215
Table 5.2 Forecasting performance: Mean-squared error, by value of  
  0.75,   0.25   0.90,   0.10
Forecast method 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.025 0.050 0.075
Perfect knowledge 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.01
  0.1
LS (ﬁnite memory) 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.19 1.57
LS (inﬁnite memory) 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.72 3.49
Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.08 1.11
  0.6
LS (ﬁnite memory) 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.02
LS (inﬁnite memory) 1.06 1.09 1.12 1.10 1.20 1.31
Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.11 1.17
  1.0
LS (ﬁnite memory) 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.02
LS (inﬁnite memory) 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.12 1.28 1.51
Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.12 1.18
Note: LS   least squares.fect knowledge (  0); note that these ﬁgures are identical across the two
speciﬁcations of   and  . In the case of the “inﬂation dove” policymaker
(  0.1), the existence of learning raises the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
from 0.9 to very nearly unity. For the policymaker with moderate prefer-
ences (  0.6), increasing   from 0 to 0.075 causes the autocorrelation of
inﬂation to rise from 0.40 to 0.60 when   0.75, or to 0.88 when   0.9.
Thus, in a model with a relatively small amount of intrinsic inﬂation per-
sistence, the autocorrelation of inﬂation can be very high, even with a
monetary policy that places signiﬁcant weight on inﬂation stabilization.
Even for the “inﬂation hawk” policymaker whose policy under perfect
knowledge results in no serial persistence in inﬂation, the perpetual learn-
ing generates a signiﬁcant amount of positive serial correlation in inﬂation.
As we discuss below, the rise in inﬂation persistence associated with per-
petual learning in turn aﬀects the optimal design of monetary policy.
5.5.3 The Economy Following Inﬂationary Shocks
Next, we consider the dynamic response of the model to a sequence of
unanticipated shocks, similar in spirit to those that arose in the 1970s. The
responses of inﬂation expectations and inﬂation do not depend on the
“source” of the shocks—that is, on whether we assume the shocks are due
to policy errors or to other disturbances.14 The conﬁguration of shocks we
have in mind would not be expected to occur frequently, of course. It is,
however, instructive in that it illustrates how in these infrequent episodes
the evolution of inﬂation expectations with learning could dramatically de-
viate from the perfect-knowledge benchmark under some policies. Inﬂa-
tion expectations in these episodes can become uncoupled from the poli-
cymakers’ objectives, resulting in a period of stagﬂation that cannot occur
under the perfect-knowledge benchmark.
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Table 5.3 Inﬂation persistence: First-order autocorrelation, by value of  
  0.75,   0.25   0.90,   0.10
  0 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.025 0.050 0.075
0.1 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.6 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.78 0.88
1.0 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.25
14. The policy error we have in mind is the systematic misperception of the economy’s non-
inﬂationary potential supply following an unobserved shift in potential output growth or an
increase in the natural rate of unemployment, as apparently experienced in the 1970s. (See,
for example, Orphanides and Williams [2002] and Orphanides 2003b.) Because such changes
can only be perceived with the passage of time, they yield errors that are recognized to be se-
rially correlated only in retrospect. In our model, the eﬀect of such errors on inﬂation dy-
namics is isomorphic to that of an exogenous serially correlated inﬂation shock.Note that under least squares learning, the model responses depend
nonlinearly on the initial values of the states c and R. In the following, we
report the average response from 1,000 simulations, each of which starts
from initial conditions drawn from the relevant steady-state distribution.
The shock is 2 percentage points in period one, and it declines in magni-
tude from periods two through eight. In period nine and beyond there is no
shock. For these experiments we assume the baseline values for   and  ,
and set   0.05.
With perfect knowledge, the series of inﬂationary shocks causes a tem-
porary rise in inﬂation and a decline in the output gap, as shown by the
dashed lines in ﬁgure 5.3. The speed at which inﬂation is brought back to
target depends on the monetary policy response, with the more aggressive
policy yielding a relatively sharp but short decline in output and a rapid re-
turn of inﬂation to target. With the inﬂation hawk or moderate policy-
maker, the peak increase in inﬂation is no more than 2.5 percentage points,
and inﬂation returns to its target within ten periods. With the inﬂation
dove policymaker, the modest policy response avoids the sharp decline in
output, but inﬂation is allowed to rise to a level about 4.5 percentage points
above target, and the return to target is more gradual, with inﬂation still re-
maining 1 percentage point above target after twenty periods.
Imperfect knowledge with learning ampliﬁes and prolongs the response
of inﬂation and output to the shocks, especially when the central bank
places signiﬁcant weight on output stabilization. The solid lines in the ﬁg-
ure show the responses of inﬂation and output under imperfect knowledge
for the three policy rules. The inﬂation hawk’s aggressive response to inﬂa-
tion eﬀectively keeps inﬂation from drifting away from target, and the re-
sponses of inﬂation and output diﬀer only modestly from those under per-
fect knowledge. In the case of balanced preferences, the magnitude of the
peak responses of inﬂation and the output gap is a bit larger than under
perfect knowledge, but the persistence of these gaps is markedly higher.
The outcomes under the inﬂation dove, however, are dramatically diﬀer-
ent. The inﬂation dove attempts to ﬁnesse a gradual reduction in inﬂation
without incurring a large decline in output, but the timid response to rising
inﬂation causes the perceived process for inﬂation to become uncoupled
from the policymaker’s objectives. Stagﬂation results, with the inﬂation
rate stuck over 8 percentage points above target, while output remains well
below potential.
The striking diﬀerences in the responses to the shocks under imperfect
knowledge are a product of the interaction between learning, the policy
rule, and inﬂation expectations. The lines in ﬁgure 5.4 show the responses
of the public’s estimates of the intercept and the slope parameter of the 
inﬂation-forecasting equation under imperfect knowledge. Under the in-
ﬂation hawk policymaker, inﬂation expectations are well anchored to the
policy objective. The serially correlated inﬂationary shocks cause some
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peaks at only 0.3 percentage point (not shown in the ﬁgure). Even for the
moderate policymaker who accommodates some of the inﬂationary shock
for a time, the perceived inﬂation target rises by just half of a percentage
point. In contrast, under the inﬂation dove policymaker, the estimated per-
sistence of inﬂation, already very high owing to the policymaker’s desire to
minimize output ﬂuctuations while responding to inﬂation shocks, rises
steadily, approaching unity. With inﬂation temporarily perceived to be a
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Fig. 5.3 Evolution of economy following inﬂation shocks (  0.75,   0.25)
Notes: The plots show the mean responses of the inﬂation rate and the output gap to a series
of inﬂationary shocks.near-random walk with positive drift, agents expect inﬂation to continue
to rise. The policymaker’s attempts to constrain inﬂation are too weak to
counteract this adverse-expectations process, and the public’s perception
of the inﬂation target rises by 5 percentage points. Despite the best of in-
tents, the gradual disinﬂation prescription that would be optimal with per-
fect knowledge yields stagﬂation—the simultaneous occurrence of per-
sistently high inﬂation and low output.
Interestingly, the inﬂation dove simulation appears to capture some key
characteristics of the U.S. economy at the end of the 1970s, and it accords
well with Chairman Volcker’s assessment of the economic situation at the
time:
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A
B
Fig. 5.4 A, Estimated intercept following inﬂation shocks (  0.75,   0.25);
B, Estimated slope following inﬂation shocks
Notes: The intercept and slope refer to the coeﬃcients c0 and c1, respectively, in the agents’
forecasting equation (9). The plots show the mean responses of the coeﬃcients c0 and c1 to a
series of inﬂationary shocks.Moreover, inﬂationary expectations are now deeply embedded in public
attitudes, as reﬂected in the practices and policies of individuals and
economic institutions. After years of false starts in the eﬀort against in-
ﬂation, there is widespread skepticism about the prospects for success.
Overcoming this legacy of doubt is a critical challenge that must be met
in shaping—and in carrying out—all our policies.
Changing both expectations and actual price performance will be
diﬃcult. But it is essential if our economic future is to be secure. (Volcker
1981, 293)
In contrast to this dismal experience, the model simulations suggest that
the rise in inﬂation—and the corresponding costs of disinﬂation—would
have been much smaller if policy had responded more aggressively to the
inﬂationary developments of the 1970s. Although this was apparently not
recognized at the time, Chairman Volcker’s analysis suggests that the stag-
ﬂationary experience of the 1970s played a role in the subsequent recogni-
tion of the value of continued vigilance against inﬂation in anchoring in-
ﬂation expectations.
5.6 Imperfect Knowledge and Monetary Policy
5.6.1 Naive Application of the Rational-Expectations Policy
We now turn to the design of eﬃcient monetary policy under imperfect
knowledge. We start by considering the experiment in which the policy-
maker sets policy under the assumption that private agents have perfect
knowledge when, in fact, they have only imperfect knowledge and base
their expectations on the perpetual-learning mechanism described above.
That is, policy follows equation (4) with the response parameter,  , com-
puted using equation (8).
Figure 5.5 compares the variability pseudo-frontier corresponding to
this equilibrium to the frontier from the perfect-knowledge benchmark.
Panel A shows the outcomes in terms of inﬂation and output-gap variabil-
ity with the baseline parameterization,   0.75. Panel B shows the results
of the same experiment with the more forward-looking speciﬁcation for in-
ﬂation,   0.9. In each case, we show the imperfect-knowledge equilibria
corresponding to three diﬀerent values of  .
With imperfect knowledge, the perpetual-learning mechanism intro-
duces random errors in expectations formation—that is, deviations of ex-
pectations from the values that would correspond to the same realization
of inﬂation and the same policy rule. These errors are costly for stabiliza-
tion and are responsible for the deterioration in performance shown in ﬁg-
ure 5.5.
This deterioration in performance is especially pronounced for the pol-
icymaker who places relatively low weight on inﬂation stabilization. As
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A
B
Fig. 5.5 A, Outcomes with RE policy (  0.75,   0.25); B, Outcomes with RE
policy (  0.9,   0.1)
Notes:Each panel shows the eﬃcient frontier with perfect knowledge and corresponding out-
comes when the RE-optimal policies are adopted while, in fact, knowledge is imperfect. The
square, triangle, and diamond correspond to preference weights   {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, re-
spectively.
seen in the simulations of the inﬂationary shocks reported above, for such
policies the time variation in the estimated autocorrelation of inﬂation in
the vicinity of unity associated with learning can be especially costly. Fur-
thermore, the deterioration in performance relative to the case of the per-
fect-knowledge benchmark is larger the greater is the role of expectationsin determining inﬂation. With the higher value for  , if a policymaker’s
preference for inﬂation stabilization is too low, the resulting outcomes un-
der imperfect knowledge are strictly dominated by the outcomes corre-
sponding to the naïve policy equilibrium for higher values of  .
5.6.2 Eﬃcient Simple Rule
Next we examine imperfect-knowledge equilibria when the policymaker
is aware of the imperfection in expectations formation and adjusts policy
accordingly. To allow for a straightforward comparison with the perfect-
knowledge benchmark, we concentrate on the eﬃcient choice of the re-
sponsiveness of policy to inﬂation,  S, in the simple linear rule
xt      S( t    ∗),
which has the same form as the optimal rule under the perfect-knowledge
benchmark.15
The eﬃcient policy response with imperfect knowledge is to be more
vigilant against inﬂation deviations from the policymaker’s target relative
to the optimal response under perfect knowledge. Figure 5.6 shows the
eﬃcient choices for   under imperfect knowledge for the two model para-
meterizations; the optimal policy under perfect knowledge—which is the
same for the two parameterizations considered—is shown again for com-
parison. As before, we present results for three diﬀerent values of  : our
baseline   0.05 and also a smaller and a larger value. The increase in the
eﬃcient value of   is especially pronounced when the policymaker places
relatively little weight on inﬂation stabilization—that is, when inﬂation
would exhibit high serial correlation under perfect knowledge. Under im-
perfect knowledge, it is eﬃcient for a policymaker to bias the response to
inﬂation upward relative to that implied by perfect knowledge. This eﬀect
is especially pronounced with the more forward-looking inﬂation process.
Consider, for instance, the baseline case   0.05. In the parameterization
with   0.9, it is never eﬃcient to set   below 0.6, the value that one
would choose under balanced preferences (  0.5) under perfect knowl-
edge.
Accounting for imperfect knowledge can signiﬁcantly improve stabi-
lization performance relative to outcomes obtained when the policymaker
naively adopts policies that are eﬃcient under perfect knowledge. Figure
5.7 compares the loss to the policymaker with perfect and imperfect
knowledge for diﬀerent preferences  . Panel A shows the outcomes for the
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15. In Orphanides and Williams (2003), we explore policies that respond directly to private
expectations of inﬂation, in addition to actual inﬂation. These rules are not fully optimal;
with imperfect knowledge, the fully optimal policy would be a nonlinear function of all the
states of the system, including the elements of cand R. However, implementation of such poli-
cies would assume the policymaker’s full knowledge of the structure of the economy—an as-
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A
B
Fig. 5.6 A, Eﬃcient policy response to inﬂation (  0.75,   0.25); B, Eﬃcient
policy response to inﬂation (  0.9,   0.1)
Notes: The solid line in each panel shows the optimal value of   under perfect knowledge for
alternative values of the relative preference for inﬂation stabilization  . Remaining lines show
the eﬃcient one-parameter policy under imperfect knowledge.
baseline parameterization,   0.75,   0.25; panel B reports the out-
comes for the alternative parameterization of inﬂation,   0.9,   0.1. In
both panels, the results we show for imperfect knowledge correspond to
our benchmark case,   0.05. The payoﬀ to reoptimizing   is largest for
policymakers who place a large weight on output stabilization, with the
gain huge in the case of   0.9. In contrast, the beneﬁts from reoptimiza-224 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
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B
Fig. 5.7 A, Policymaker loss (  0.75,   0.25); B, Policymaker loss (  0.9,
  0.1)
Notes: The two panels show the loss corresponding to alternative values of the relative pref-
erence for inﬂation stabilization   for diﬀerent assumptions regarding knowledge and diﬀer-
ent model parameterizations. The thick-solid line shows the case of perfect knowledge. The
dashed line shows the outcomes assuming the policymaker chooses   assuming perfect
knowledge when knowledge is in fact imperfect. The thin-solid line shows the outcomes for
the eﬃcient one-parameter policy under imperfect knowledge.
tion are trivial for policymakers who are primarily concerned with inﬂa-
tion stabilization regardless of  .
The key ﬁnding that the public’s imperfect knowledge raises the eﬃcient
policy response to inﬂation is not unique to the model considered here and
carries over to models with alternative speciﬁcations. In particular, we ﬁndthe same result when the equation for inﬂation is replaced with the “New
Keynesian” variant studied by Galí and Gertler (1999; see also Gaspar and
Smets 2002). Moreover, we ﬁnd that qualitatively similar results obtain if
agents include additional lags of inﬂation in their forecasting models.
5.6.3 Dissecting the Beneﬁts of Vigilance
In order to gain insight into the interaction of imperfections in the for-
mation of expectations and eﬃcient policy, we consider a simple example
where the parameters of the inﬂation-forecast model vary according to an
exogenous stochastic process.
From equation (5), recall that expectations formation is driven by the
stochastic coeﬃcient expectations function:
(13)  e
t 1   c0,t   c1,t t.
For the present purposes, let c0,t and c1,t vary relative to their perfect-
knowledge benchmark values; that is, c0,t   c0
P   v0,t and , c1,t   c1
P   v1,t,
where v0,t and v1,t are independent zero-mean normal distributions with
variances  2
0 and  2
1.
Substituting expectations into the Phillips curve and rearranging terms
results in the following reduced-form characterization of the dynamics of
inﬂation in terms of the control variable x:




 xt    ut 1   et 1    u0,t.
In this case, the optimal policy with stochastic coeﬃcients has the same lin-
ear structure as the optimal policy with ﬁxed coeﬃcients and perfect
knowledge, and the optimal policy response is monotonically increasing in
the variance  2
1.16
Although informative, the simple case examined above ignores the im-
portant eﬀect of the serial correlation in v0 and v1 that obtains under im-
perfect knowledge. The eﬃcient choice of   cannot be written in closed
form in the case of serially correlated processes for v0and v1, but a set of sto-
chastic simulations is informative. Consider the eﬃcient choice of  for our
benchmark economy with balanced preferences,   0.5. Under perfect
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16. See Turnovsky (1977) and Craine (1979) for early applications of the well-known opti-
mal control results for this case. For our model, speciﬁcally, the optimal response can be writ-
ten as
   ,
where s is the positive root of the quadratic equation 0    (1 –  )(1 –  )2   (  2   [1 –  ]
[1 –  ]2 2 2
1)s   ( 2 2
1 – 1) 2s2.
While the optimal policy response to inﬂation deviations from target,  , is independent of
 2
0, the variance of the  0,tdiﬀerentiation reveals that it is increasing in  2
1), the variance of  1,t.
As  2
1 → 0, of course, this solution collapses to the optimal policy with perfect knowledge.
 (1    )s
   
(1    )(1    )    2sknowledge, the optimal choice of   is approximately 0.6. Instead, simula-
tions assuming an exogenous autoregressive process for either c0 or c1 with
a variance and autocorrelation matching our economy with imperfect
knowledge suggest an eﬃcient choice of   approximately equal to 0.7—re-
gardless of whether the variation is due to c0or to c1. For comparison, with
the endogenous variation in the parameters in the economy with learning,
the eﬃcient choice of   is 0.75.
As noted earlier, for a ﬁxed policy choice of policy responsiveness in the
policy rule,  , the uncertainty in the process of expectations formation with
imperfect knowledge raises the persistence of the inﬂation process relative
to the perfect-knowledge case. This can be seen by comparing the thick-
solid and dashed lines in the two panels of ﬁgure 5.8, which plot the per-
sistence of inﬂation when policy follows the rational-expectations (RE) op-
timal rule and agents have perfect and imperfect knowledge (with   
0.05), respectively. This increase in inﬂation persistence complicates sta-
bilization efforts as it raises, on average, the output costs associated with
restoring price stability when inﬂation deviates from its target.
The key beneﬁt of adopting greater vigilance against inﬂation deviations
from the policymaker’s target in the presence of imperfect knowledge
comes from reducing this excess serial persistence of inﬂation. More ag-
gressive policies reduce the persistence of inﬂation, thus facilitating its
control. The resulting eﬃcient choice of reduction in inﬂation persistence
is reﬂected by the thin-solid lines in ﬁgure 5.8.
5.7 Learning with a Known Inﬂation Target
Throughout the preceding discussion and analysis, we have implicitly
assumed that agents do not rely on explicit knowledge regarding the poli-
cymaker’s objectives in forming expectations. Arguably, this assumption
best describes situations where a central bank does not successfully com-
municate to the public an explicit numerical inﬂation target and, perhaps,
a clear weighting of its price and economic stability objectives. Since the
adoption and clear communication of an explicit numerical inﬂation tar-
get is one of the key characteristics of inﬂation-targeting regimes, it is of in-
terest to explore the implications of this dimension of inﬂation targeting in
our model. To do so, we consider the case where the policymaker explicitly
communicates the ultimate inﬂation target to the public; that is, we assume
that the public exactly knows the value of  ∗ and explicitly incorporates
this information in forming inﬂation expectations. Of course, even in an
explicit inﬂation-targeting regime, the public may remain somewhat un-
certain regarding the policymaker’s inﬂation target,  ∗, so that this as-
sumption of a perfectly known inﬂation target may not be obtainable in
practice and may be seen as an illustrative limiting case.
The assumption of a known numerical inﬂation target simpliﬁes the
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Fig. 5.8 A, Inﬂation persistence (  0.75,   0.25); B, Inﬂation persistence 
(  0.9,   0.1)
Notes:The ﬁgure shows the population ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation corresponding
to policies based on alternative inﬂation stabilization weights  . For each value of  , the
thick-solid line shows the inﬂation persistence in the benchmark case of rational expectations
with perfect knowledge. The dashed line shows the corresponding persistence when policy
follows the RE-optimal solution but knowledge is imperfect. The thin-solid line shows the
persistence associated with the eﬃcient one-parameter rule with imperfect knowledge.public’s inﬂation forecasting problem. From equations (7) and (8), the re-
duced-form equation for inﬂation under rational expectations is given by






  ( t    ∗)   et 1    ut 1.
With a known inﬂation target, the inﬂation-forecasting model consistent
with rational expectations is simply
(16)  i    ∗   c1,t( i 1    ∗)   vi.
Note that in this forecasting equation only the slope parameter, c1, is esti-
mated; thus, in terms of the forecasting equation, the assumption of a
known inﬂation target corresponds to a zero restriction on c0 (when the
forecasting regression is written in terms of deviations of inﬂation from its
target). As in the case of an unknown inﬂation target, constant-gain ver-
sions of equations (10) and (11) can be used to model the evolution of the
formation of inﬂation expectations in this case. The one-step-ahead fore-
cast of inﬂation is given by
(17)  e
t 1    ∗   c1,t( t    ∗),
and again, in the limit of perfect knowledge (that is, as   → 0), the expec-
tations function above converges to rational expectations with the slope
coeﬃcient c1
P   (1 –   –  )/(1 –  ). This formulation captures a key ra-
tionale for adopting an explicit inﬂation-targeting regime: to reduce the
public’s uncertainty and possible confusion about the central bank’s pre-
cise inﬂation objective and thereby to anchor the public’s inﬂation expec-
tations to the central bank’s objective.17
Eliminating uncertainty about the inﬂation target improves macroeco-
nomic performance, in terms of both inﬂation and output stability. The
thin-solid lines in panel A of ﬁgure 5.9trace the RE-policy pseudo-frontiers
in the case of a known inﬂation target. For comparison, the dashed lines
show the pseudo-frontiers assuming that the inﬂation target is not known
by the public (this repeats the curves shown in ﬁgure 5.5 for our benchmark
case,   0.05). Recall that the pseudo-frontier is obtained by evaluating
the performance of the economy under imperfect knowledge for the set of
policies for     (0,1] given by equation (8) that would be optimal under
perfect knowledge. As seen in the ﬁgure, economic outcomes are clearly
more favorable when the inﬂation target is assumed to be perfectly known
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17. The adoption of inﬂation targeting may aﬀect the private formation of expectations in
other ways than by tying down the ultimate inﬂation objective. For instance, Svensson (2002)
argues that inﬂation-targeting central banks should also make explicit their preference
weighting,  , which in principle could further reduce the public’s uncertainty about policy ob-
jectives. However, given the remaining uncertainty about model parameters (  and   in our
model), the uncertainty about the value of c1is not eliminated in this case. The extent to which

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.than otherwise. Still, the resulting pseudo-frontiers lie well to the northeast
of those that would obtain under perfect knowledge. Evidently, imperfect
knowledge of the dynamic process for inﬂation alone has large costs in
terms of performance, especially when expectations are very important for
determining inﬂation outcomes, represented by the case of   0.9.
The basic ﬁnding that, relative to the perfect-knowledge benchmark,
policy should be more vigilant against inﬂation under imperfect knowl-
edge also obtains in the case of a known inﬂation target. Panel B of ﬁgure
5.9 shows the optimal values of   for the three cases we consider: perfect
knowledge, imperfect knowledge with known  ∗, and imperfect knowl-
edge with unknown  ∗. When  ∗ is known, the optimal choice of   is
slightly lower than when  ∗ is unknown. Even with a known inﬂation tar-
get, however, it remains optimal to be more vigilant against inﬂation rela-
tive to the perfect-knowledge case. An exception is the extreme case of   
1 when the optimal value of   is exactly unity, the same value that obtains
under perfect knowledge.18
A striking result, seen most clearly in the case of   0.9, is that the op-
timal value of   is relatively insensitive over a large range of values for the
stabilization preference weight,  , whether the inﬂation is known or un-
known. By contrast, under perfect knowledge, the optimal value of   is
quite sensitive to  . An implication of this ﬁnding is that with imperfect
knowledge there is relatively little “cost” associated with policies designed
as if inﬂation were the central bank’s primary objective, even when policy-
makers place substantial value in reducing output variability in fact. By
contrast, as shown above, the costs of optimizing policies that incorrectly
place a large weight on output stability under the assumption of perfect
knowledge can be quite large. This asymmetry suggests that the practice of
concentrating attention primarily on price stability in the formulation of
monetary policy may be seen as a robust strategy for achieving both a high
degree of price stability and a high degree of economic stability.
5.8 Conclusion
We examine the eﬀects of a relatively modest deviation from rational
expectations resulting from perpetual learning on the part of economic
agents with imperfect knowledge. The presence of imperfections in the for-
mation of expectations makes the monetary policy problem considerably
more diﬃcult than would appear under rational expectations. Using a
simple linear model, we show that although inﬂation expectations are
nearly eﬃcient, imperfect knowledge raises the persistence of inﬂation and
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18. In this limiting case, estimates of c1 are symmetrically distributed around zero. Hence,
in terms of a simple rule of the form given by equation (4), there is no gain from overre-
sponding, relative to the case of perfect knowledge, to actual inﬂation.distorts the policymaker’s trade-oﬀbetween inﬂation and output stabiliza-
tion. As a result, policies that appear eﬃcient under rational expectations
can result in economic outcomes signiﬁcantly worse than would be ex-
pected by analysis based on the assumption of perfect knowledge. The
costs of failing to account for the presence of imperfect knowledge are par-
ticularly pronounced for policymakers who place a relatively greater value
on stabilizing output: a strategy emphasizing tight inﬂation control can
yield superior economic performance, in terms of both inﬂation and out-
put stability, than can policies that appear eﬃcient under rational expec-
tations. More generally, policies emphasizing tight inﬂation control reduce
the persistence of inﬂation and the incidence of large deviations of expec-
tations from the policy objective, thereby mitigating the inﬂuence of im-
perfect knowledge on the economy. In addition, tighter control of inﬂation
makes the economy less prone to costly stagﬂationary episodes.
The adoption and eﬀective communication of an explicit numerical in-
ﬂation target also mitigate the inﬂuence of imperfect knowledge on the
economy. Communication of an inﬂation target may greatly improve at-
tainable macroeconomic outcomes and aﬀord greater economic stability
relative to the outcomes that are attainable when the public perceives the
policymaker’s ultimate inﬂation objective less clearly. These results high-
light the potential value of communicating a central bank’s inﬂation ob-
jective and of continued vigilance against inﬂation in anchoring inﬂation
expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability.
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Comment George W. Evans
Introduction
This is a very nice paper. The main points are important, the structure is
simple and clear, and I ﬁnd the key arguments persuasive. In my comments
I am going to begin by summarizing the heart of the Orphanides-Williams
argument. Then I will locate their paper within the rapidly growing litera-
ture on learning and monetary policy. Finally I will return to their paper
and oﬀer a number of speciﬁc comments on natural extensions or alterna-
tive approaches.
Summary of the Argument
Orphanides and Williams (OW) work with a simple two-equation macro
model. The ﬁrst equation is an augmented Phillips curve with inertia:
 t 1      e
t 1   (1    ) t    yt 1   et 1,
where  t 1 is the rate of inﬂation between period t and period t   1,  e
t 1 is
the rate of inﬂation over this period expected at time t, yt 1 is the level of the
output gap in t 1, and et 1is a white noise inﬂation shock. The second equa-
tion is an aggregate-demand relation that embodies a lagged policy eﬀect,
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gon.yt 1   xt   ut 1,
where xtis set by monetary policy at tand ut 1is white noise. Through mon-
etary policy it is assumed that policymakers are able one period ahead to
control aggregate output up to the unpredictable random disturbance ut 1.
The combination of this aggregate-demand equation and the neoclassi-
cal (as opposed to neo-Keynesian) inﬂation equation yields a particularly
tractable model for studying the eﬀects of private agents’ learning. In par-
ticular, the timing assumptions are carefully crafted to yield simplicity.
Policymakers choose the xt process to minimize
(1    )Eyt
2    E( t    ∗)2.
This is a standard quadratic loss function. We can think of   as reﬂecting
policymakers’ preferences, which may (or may not) be derived from the
preferences of the representative agent.
Optimal Policy under Rational Expectations
Under rational expectations (RE), optimal policy takes the form of the feed-
back rule
xt      P( t    ∗),
where  P    P( ,  /[1 –  ]). This leads to an eﬃciency frontier, described
by a familiar trade-oﬀ between    and   y, shown in their ﬁgure 5.1.
For this choice of feedback parameter, in the rational-expectations equi-
librium (REE) inﬂation follows the process
 t   c0
P   c1
P  t 1   noiset
Et t 1   c0




P depend on  P /(1 –  ). Here noiset is white noise. The super-
script Prefers to “perfect knowledge,” which OW use as a synonym for RE.
Thus, under RE the problem is quite straightforward. How “aggressive”
policy should be with respect to deviations of inﬂation from target depends
in a natural way on the structural parameters  ,   and policymaker pref-
erences as described by  .
Least Squares Learning
Now we make the crucial step of backing away from RE. Instead of as-
suming that agents are endowed a priori with RE, we model the agents as
forecasting in the same way that an econometrician might: by assuming a
simple time series model for the variable of interest, and by estimating its
parameters and using it to forecast. Speciﬁcally, suppose that private
agents believe that inﬂation follows an AR(1) process, as it does in an REE,
but that they do not know c0
P, c1
P. Instead they estimate the parameters of
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by a least squares–type regression, and at time t forecast
 e
t 1   c0,t   c1,t t.
Over time the estimates c0,t, c1,t are updated as new data become available.
We consider two cases for this updating.
Inﬁnite Memory—“Decreasing Gain”
First we suppose that agents literally do least squares using all the data.
We assume that policymakers do not explicitly take account of private
agent learning and follow the feedback rule with     P. Then, with “inﬁ-
nite memory” (no discounting of observations), one can show (e.g., Evans
and Honkapohja 2001)
c0,t, c1,t → c0
P, c1
P w.p.1,
so that asymptotically we get the optimal REE.
Technically the most convenient way to set up least squares learning by
private agents is using the recursive least squares (RLS) algorithm.1 In this
algorithm the agents carry their parameter estimates (and an estimate of
the second moment matrix of the regressors) into the next period. Updated
estimates next period are then generated recursively using the most recent
data point. Because each data point is counted equally by least squares, the
“gain” t (i.e., the eﬀective weight placed on the last data point) is given by
 t 1/t(i.e., by the inverse of the sample size). In the learning literature this
is called the “decreasing gain” case, because  t → 0 as t →  .
I remark that convergence to the REE is not obvious. This is because the
model is “self-referential”: that is, the evolution of the data depends on ex-
pectations and hence on the estimated coeﬃcients, and these in turn are
updated using the data generated. Convergence to REE does take place be-
cause the equilibrium in this model satisﬁes the “E-stability” conditions
that govern stability in such a system.
Finite Memory—“Constant Gain”
OW make a small but signiﬁcant change to the standard least squares
updating formula. Instead of assuming that all observations count equally,
they discount or downweight past data. In terms of the RLS algorithm,
this is accomplished technically by setting the gain, the weight on the most
recent observation used to update estimates, to a small constant (i.e., set-
ting  t    ; e.g., 0.05).
Why would it be natural for agents to use a constant rather than de-
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1. The technique of formulating learning as a recursive algorithm, and then applying sto-
chastic approximation tools to analyze convergence, was introduced by Marcet and Sargent
(1989).creasing gain? The main rationale for this procedure is that it allows esti-
mates to remain alert to structural shifts. As economists, and as econome-
tricians, we tend to believe that structural changes occasionally occur, and
we might therefore assume that private agents also recognize and allow for
this. Although in principle one might attempt to model the process of
structural change, this typically unduly strains the amount of knowledge
we have about the economic structure. A reasonable alternative is to adjust
parameter estimators to reﬂect the fact that recent observations convey
more accurate information on the economy’s law of motion than do past
data, and “constant gain” estimators are one very natural way of accom-
plishing this downweighting of past data.2
Implications of Constant-Gain Least Squares
With constant-gain procedures, estimates no longer fully converge to the
REE. The estimators c0,t, c1,t converge instead to a stochastic process. Be-
cause of this, OW use the term “perpetual learning” to refer to the constant
gain case.
If the gain parameter   is very small, then estimators will be close to the
REE values for most of the time with high probability, and output and in-
ﬂation will be near their REE paths. Nonetheless, small plausible values
like   0.05 can lead to very diﬀerent outcomes in the calibrations OW
consider. In particular, they ﬁnd the following:
1. The standard deviations of c0,t and c1,t are large even though forecast
performance remains good.
2. There is a substantial increase in the persistence of inﬂation, com-
pared to the REE.
3. Most strikingly, the policy frontier shifts out very substantially and in
a nonmonotonic way (see their ﬁgure 5.5).
Policy Implications
Under perpetual learning if policymakers keep to the same class of rules
xt      S( t    ∗),
then they should choose a diﬀerent  . Here the notation  S is meant to in-
dicate that we restrict policymakers to choose from the same “simple” class
of policy rules. There are four main implications for policy in the context
of constant-gain (perpetual) learning by private agents.
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2. Two remarks are in order. First, an alternative rationale for constant gain is that it can be
an equilibrium in learning rules, even if structural change is not present; see section 14.4 of
Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Second, there are other ways of allowing for structural
change: for example, through time-varying gain sequences or explicit models of structural
variation.1. Naive policy choice can be strictly ineﬃcient. This is illustrated in the
second panel of their ﬁgure 5.5. By “naive” policy is meant the policy that
assumes RE (perfect knowledge) on the part of agents, when in fact the
agents are following perpetual learning with   0. In particular, there are
cases in which increasing  Swould decrease the standard deviations of both
inﬂation and output.
2. In general, policy should be more hawkish; that is, under perpetual
learning the monetary authorities should pick a larger  S than if agents
had RE.
3. Following a sequence of unanticipated inﬂation shocks, inﬂation
doves (i.e., policymakers with low   reﬂecting a low  ) can do very poorly.
This is illustrated in OW’s ﬁgure 5.3.
4. If the inﬂation target  ∗ is known to private agents, so that they need
estimate only the slope parameter c1, then the policy frontier is more fa-
vorable than when it is not known. This is illustrated in the ﬁrst panel of
their ﬁgure 5.9.
I will return to a discussion of these and other speciﬁc results after dis-
cussing learning and monetary policy in a more general setting.
Learning in Monetary Policy
Recently, considerable research has begun to focus on the implications
for monetary policy when explicit account is taken of the literature on
adaptive/econometric learning in macroeconomics.3
I will give a selective overview of this recent research and locate OW
within this context. Then I will return to a discussion of OW. There are four
main issues I will use to group my general remarks: (a) the theoretical roles
played by learning, (b) the question of who or what group of agents is
learning, (c) the particular implications of constant-gain learning, and (d)
some further (personal) thoughts on rationality.
Roles for Learning
There are three main types of result that can be delivered by incorporat-
ing learning into a monetary policy model.
Stability under Private Agent Learning
An REE need not necessarily be stable under private agent learning. It
is logically possible that if agents follow least squares learning (with the
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3. For example, two recent workshops or conferences have considered this topic, one at the
Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank, in February 2001, on “Learning and Model Misspeciﬁca-
tion,” and a second at the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, in March 2003, on “Monetary Pol-
icy and Learning.”usual decreasing gain) then the system fails to converge to an REE, even if
their parameter estimates are initially close to the REE.
This theoretical possibility of instability turns out to be a genuine con-
cern for monetary policy in New Keynesian or New Phillips curve models
(as is the related but distinct issue of indeterminacy). Bullard and Mitra
(2002) show that stability under private agent learning should not be taken
for granted if policymakers follow Taylor-type rules. Depending on the
speciﬁc formulation of the rule, instability can arise for certain choices of
parameter settings. Evans and Honkapohja (2002, 2003a, 2003c) examine
this issue in the context of optimal monetary policy. They show that sta-
bility under learning is a pervasive problem when the interest rate rule is
formulated as a reaction to fundamental shocks, but it can be overcome
when the rule reacts appropriately to private expectations. Recent work by
Preston (2003) has considered this issue in the context of long-horizon
agents.
Selection Criterion
In some models the phenomenon of indeterminacy (i.e., multiple REE)
arises. In this setting, learning can provide a natural way of choosing be-
tween equilibria. A particular question of interest is the following. It is
known that when a steady state of a linear model is indeterminate there ex-
ist “sunspot” equilibria—that is, REE in which the solution is driven by ex-
traneous noise. Such solutions, with economic ﬂuctuations driven in a self-
fulﬁlling way by extrinsic random variables, would usually be considered
an unintended and undesirable by-product of economic policy. A particu-
lar question of interest, in cases of multiple equilibria, is whether the sun-
spot equilibria can be stable under learning.
It has been known for some time that it is possible in some cases for
sunspot equilibria to be stable under learning. This was initially demon-
strated by Woodford (1990) in the context of the overlapping-generations
model of money. In general, whether a sunspot equilibrium is stable under
learning depends on the model and the particular solution (see chap. 12 of
Evans and Honkapohja 2001). There has been recent interest in whether
stable sunspot solutions can arise in more realistic monetary models. In
particular, Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2003) look at when this can
occur in cash-in-advance models, and Honkapohja and Mitra (forthcom-
ing), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004), and Evans and McGough (forthcom-
ing) examine the issue for New Keynesian models.
Non-REE Learning Dynamics
Finally, we move to the possibility that the economy under learning gen-
erates solutions that in some way go beyond RE. Here it appears useful to
group results into two broad categories. One possibility is that learning
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are endowed with an econometric model that is misspeciﬁed asymptoti-
cally, as discussed in chapter 13 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). For ex-
ample, agents may omit some variables that help forecast the variables of
interest, or their forecasting model may fail to capture nonlinearities that
are present.
Somewhat more radically, learning may generate “persistent learning
dynamics” (see chap. 14 of Evans and Honkapohja 2001) as a result of
local instability of an REE under learning (as in Bullard 1994) or due to a
learning rule that fails to fully converge to REE parameter values (as in
constant-gain learning rules). The OW paper falls into this last class:
private agents use a learning rule in which parameter estimates never quite
converge to REE values. This “perpetual learning” then turns out to have
major policy implications, even when the deviation from REE might be
thought not too large.
Who Is Learning?
The earliest literature on learning focused on private agents (i.e. house-
holds and ﬁrms). In dynamic macroeconomic models private agents, in
order to make optimal decisions, must make forecasts of relevant future
variables. Clearly the expectations of households and ﬁrms do matter
enormously for the actual evolution of the economy. The RE revolution
made the crucial advance of deﬁning and analyzing what it means for ex-
pectations to be consistent with the economic structure and optimizing
agents. However, this has had the potential disadvantage of demoting
private expectations as an independent force. Consequently it was natural
that the initial focus of the learning literature was on private agent learn-
ing. The OW paper follows the primary strand of the literature in this re-
spect.
However, policymakers also need to form expectations and make fore-
casts, and they too are not endowed with full knowledge of the economic
structure or fully rational forecast functions. Some recent research has be-
gun to tackle this issue. Most notably, Thomas Sargent’s (1999) book on
the disinﬂation in the 1990s emphasized learning by policymakers about a
(misspeciﬁed) Phillips curve trade-oﬀ. Sargent’s model incorporates a tan-
talizing combination of misspeciﬁcation, learning, and optimal policy for-
mulation.
Obviously it is possible to allow for separate learning by private agents
and policymakers. In fact, Sargent (1999) actually allows for this in some
cases, although much of his analysis, and that of Cho, Williams, and Sar-
gent (2002), focuses on learning by policymakers with RE assumed for
private agents. Simultaneous learning by policymakers is also analyzed in
Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) and discussed in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003c).
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agents and policymakers need to make forecasts of future aggregate vari-
ables, but in addition, implementation of optimal policy may require si-
multaneous estimation of structural parameters. This issue is considered in
Evans and Honkapohja (2003a, 2003c).
Constant-Gain Learning
As already emphasized, the use of constant-gain (or “perpetual”) learn-
ing plays a central role in OW. In general, constant-gain learning can lead
to a number of phenomena. First, the work of Sargent (1999), Cho, Wil-
liams, and Sargent (2002), Williams (2002), and Bullard and Cho (2002)
emphasizes the possibility of “escapes”—that is, occasional big devia-
tions from a unique REE. This is a surprising ﬁnding: for signiﬁcant peri-
ods of time learning dynamics can drive the economy away from the REE,
but in a predictable direction.
When there are multiple REE, escapes can take a diﬀerent form. The
most widely examined case is the case of multiple distinct REE steady
states. Here escapes take the form of periodic shifts between the diﬀerent
steady states as a result of large random shocks interacting with the learn-
ing dynamics. This phenomenon is seen in chapter 14 of Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), the hyperinﬂation model of Marcet and Nicolini
(2003c), the exchange rate model of Kasa (2004) and the liquidity trap
model of Evans and Honkapohja (2003b).
Finally, it turns out that, even in a quite standard model with a unique
REE and without the more exotic eﬀects just described, constant-gain
learning has signiﬁcant implications for optimal policy. This is the impor-
tant new ﬁnding that is demonstrated in the current paper by OW.
Some Further Thoughts on Rationality
In constructing economic models we have three kinds of agents:
(a)private agents, (b) policymakers, and (c) economists (us). In the bad old
days of adaptive expectations, private agents made systematic mistakes,
but we the economists were very smart. We told policymakers what to do,
so they were smart too.
The RE revolution changed all this. Now private agents became smart,
and policymakers (and earlier economists) were mistaken, as shown by the
Lucas critique. As theorists we were again smart (because we understood
how private agents really formed expectations), but as econometricians we
were not quite so smart. This is because as econometricians we had to esti-
mate parameters that were known with certainty by the private agents and
theorists.
The adaptive-learning viewpoint has the enormous advantage over these
earlier approaches that it (potentially) achieves greater cognitive consis-
tency between these three kinds of agents. In particular, private agents are
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forecasting role. Of course, as theorists we still typically analyze models
with a speciﬁed structure that is eﬀectively known only to us, but at least it
can be consistently treated as unknown to private agents, policymakers,
and econometricians. Furthermore, the degree of smartness of each group
is a matter of choice or judgement for us as theorists.
An important aspect of this “bounded rationality” approach is that
many features of RE do carry over to the adaptive-learning approach. For
example, the Lucas critique can apply under bounded rationality, as em-
phasized in Evans and Ramey (2003). The Lucas critique will often arise if
agents attempt to forecast in an optimal way, even if they are not perfectly
rational in the sense of “rational expectations.”
Back to Orphanides and Williams
Returning now to the OW paper, let me make some speciﬁc critical com-
ments and suggest some extensions.
1. The inﬂation shocks experiment. My ﬁrst point concerns the inﬂation
shocks scenario shown in OW’s ﬁgure 5.3. OW examine a sequence of
unanticipated positive inﬂation shocks starting with e1 2 percent and de-
clining to zero over nine (semiannual) periods. My main point is that this
is more like a structural shift, and that the eﬀects are the same as a decrease
in potential output over four years. This raises several questions that would
need to be explicitly addressed in a full treatment of this issue.
Suppose, for example, that et 1 is partly predictable, as seems appropri-
ate for a structural shift, and that the loss function is
L   E0 ∑
 
t 0
[(1    )(yt   yt ∗)2    ( t    ∗)2] .
Depending on the source of the shock, policymakers may want to lower
their output target yt ∗(to yt ∗ – –1et). Even if policymakers continue to set
yt ∗   0, policy should take into account expected et 1   0.
This is perhaps a setup in which it would be particularly fruitful also to
incorporate policymaker learning.
2. Bias toward “hawkishness.” OW show that policymakers should be
more hawkish. The intuition for this result is fairly intuitive. A more hawk-
ish (high  ) policy helps to keep inﬂation expectations  e
t 1 “in line” (i.e.,
closer to RE values). This gives policy an additional role, besides stabiliz-
ing y and  , and this additional role means that under perpetual learning
it is optimal for policymakers to be more hawkish than they would be, for
given policymaker preferences, under RE.
This observation leads naturally to the question of how robust this result
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t 1 also matters. The structure
in such models is
yt    ϕ(it    e
t 1)   ye
t 1   gt
 t    yt      e
t 1      t 1   ut.
Will the presence of ye
t 1 in the “IS” curve (the ﬁrst equation) make the di-
rection of bias for the policymaker ambiguous? The answer is not clear a
priori and would need to be explicitly analyzed.
3. Choice of gain parameter  . The value of   is taken as given and not
explained. This is quite standard in the constant-gain learning literature. In
one respect this is convenient, since it can then be treated as a parameter to
be estimated empirically.
However, one can think about the issue further from a theoretical view-
point. The most typical rationale for introducing constant gain, as indi-
cated above, is that it is a way of allowing for structural shifts. The choice
of   can then be thought of as providing a balance between tracking and
ﬁltering: high values of   allow the estimator to better track structural
change, but with the disadvantage of yielding noisier estimators.
One possibility would then be to explicitly introduce structural shifts
into the model and ﬁnd the optimal value of  . This type of exercise is done
in chapter 14 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and in Evans and Ramey
(2003). In OW this would add complexity and is unlikely to matter. How-
ever, the issue of the optimal choice of gain is likely to become important
in future work.
4. Smarter agents. Using the bounded rationality approach one can al-
ways ask: should the agents be smarter? less smart? This is always a matter
of judgment. There are several possible ways in which the private agents in
OW could be “smarter.” For example, private agents could be modeled as
estimating an AR(p) instead of an AR(1). Indeed, one could consider the
possibility that the agents choose the lag length p in the same way as an ap-
plied econometrician. Similarly, agents might consider forecasting based
on a vector autoregression (VAR), perhaps using one of the standard sta-
tistics to choose the order of the VAR.
It seems likely that the qualitative results would be unaﬀected, but it
would be of interest to know how the detailed results depend on such spec-
iﬁcation issues. It might appear unsatisfactory, compared to the lack of am-
biguity in the RE approach, to be faced with questions about lag length and
model speciﬁcation. But this is really a strength of the adaptive-learning
framework. Econometricians dealing with forecasting and estimation
problems inevitably face precisely such issues in practice. It seems absurd to
assume that private agents and policymakers have clear-cut answers to
problems that in eﬀect remain research issues for us as econometricians.
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This is an important paper. Theoretically, Orphanides and Williams pro-
vide a new reason for studying adaptive learning, based on optimal policy
when agents follow “perpetual learning” rules. From an applied viewpoint,
the paper suggests another factor that can generate stagﬂation, and it pro-
vides policy recommendations that are intuitive and plausible. I hope (and
conﬁdently anticipate) that the authors (and others) will do more work
along these lines.
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Discussion Summary
Lars Svensson remarked that the Orphanides-Williams model provides an
important argument for announcing an inﬂation target: namely, that this
simpliﬁes private-sector learning, stabilizes inﬂation expectations, and
thereby allows the central bank to respond less aggressively to inﬂation
than it would have to do otherwise. This should have some bearing on the
Federal Reserve’s decision on an inﬂation target. He also suggested that, in
addition to the simpler linear policies presented in the paper, the authors
should also compute the optimal, nonlinear policies.
Ricardo Caballero commented on the arbitrariness of the particular
model of learning used in the paper, and suggested that it would be more
convincing to consider forms of learning in which the degree of learning
depended upon the magnitude of observed shocks.
Olivier Blanchard pointed out that the aggressive policy responses to in-
ﬂation are driven by the assumptions about the source of model uncer-
tainty and might be overturned in a setting in which uncertainty about out-
put was more important. In the current U.S. situation, for example, there
was greater uncertainty about growth going forward than about inﬂation.
Frank Smets asked whether the form of adaptive learning used in the pa-
per provided a rationale for price-level targeting.
Donald Kohn argued that output stabilization had an important role to
play for agents’ ability to learn about permanent income. Moreover, he
suggested considering a situation in which both the central bank and pri-
vate agents were learning, which would allow for private agents’ and policy-
makers’ inﬂation expectations to be diﬀerent, a situation that had been
important between 1994 and 2001.
John Berry stressed that how agents interpreted policy outcomes de-
pended importantly on communication between policymakers and thepub-
lic. The wage-price controls of 1972, for example, were judged by the press
as a failure despite the fact that inﬂation was merely a few tenths of a per-
centage point above the announced target rate of 2.5 percent. Based on this
experience, he asked whether there was an appropriate role for ambiguity
in communications with the public.
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formation sets played an important role in the results, and suggested al-
lowing agents to use lags of both inﬂation and the output gap in their fore-
casting rules.
Gregory Mankiwpointed out that the particular value of the gain chosen
by the authors was a suspicious free parameter, and he argued that it would
be more convincing to derive the optimal gain from explicit modeling of
the source of uncertainty, which would lead back to rational expectations.
Christopher Sims argued that the results under learning depended criti-
cally on the speciﬁc form of the equation that agents are learning about. In
the present case, an important question was whether agents had to learn
about the intercept or the slope of the Phillips curve, and at which rates
they were updating their estimates of either of these parameters.
John Williams responded that their results remained robust even when
agents used several lags of both inﬂation and the output gap in their inﬂa-
tion forecasts, due to the high degree of inﬂation persistence generated by
the model. He argued that, while the precise value of the gain used in learn-
ing could be determined inside the model, a constant-gain formula for
learning was both realistic and robust. Adding uncertainty about the fu-
ture output gap was a topic of work in progress, but it should not overturn
the results presented in their paper because of the important role played by
the persistence of inﬂation in deriving inﬂation forecasts.
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